In my dissertation, I argue that we should change the way we think about both perceptual constancy and perceptual objectivity (i.e. the capacity of perception to present the world as objective, independent of our viewpoint).
I defend an account of constancy rooted in a sort of pragmatic principle, that is, in the idea that we should start by looking at what constancy is for, what it does.
I reject the ‘standard’ account of constancy according to which constancy is achieved when the perceptual system ‘extracts’ a distal property from a largely underdetermined proximal stimulus, and ‘discounts’ contextual information. This approach, I think, is too visuo-centric and cannot fully capture the role that constancies play in providing perceptual stability for action.
My work is largely inspired by traditions such as ecological psychology, pragmatism, embodied cognitive science, and phenomenology.
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Here is a couple of things I have published:
Naturalizing Qualia (2017, Phenomenology and Mind)
Enactivism and the ‘problem’ of Perceptual Presence (forthcoming, Synthese)
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These articles are currently under review (drafts available upon request):
- How and why Enactivism explains perceptual presence
- The Problem of Invariance
- Reconsidering Perceptual Constancy (co-authored with Tony Chemero)
- Should we be realists in perceptual psychology?
And here are a few more projects I have in the works (email me if you’d like to know more!):
- The ‘relational constructs’ of gloss and timbre (co-authored with Mazviita Chirimuuta) – under contract.
- Issues on the nature of sounds
- Perception, belief, and officiating in basketball
- Constructivist psychology, computation, and perceptual content
- Autonomy, aesthetic experience, and sensory aids
